Abstract. We present a logical framework for formalizing connections between finitary combinatorics and measure theory or ergodic theory that have appeared various places throughout the literature. We develop the basic syntax and semantics of this logic and give applications, showing that the method can express the classic Furstenberg correspondence and to give a short proof of the Szemerédi Regularity Lemma. We also derive some connections between the model-theoretic notion of stability and the Gowers uniformity norms from combinatorics.
Introduction
Since the 1970's, diagonalization arguments (and their generalization to ultrafilters) have been used to connect results in finitary combinatorics with results in measure theory or ergodic theory [13] . Although it has long been known that this connection can be described with first-order logic, a recent striking paper by Hrushovski [21] demonstrated that modern developments in model theory can be used to give new substantive results in this area as well.
Papers on various aspects of this interaction have been published from a variety of perspectives, with almost as wide a variety of terminology [29, 10, 9, 1, 31, 12, 4] . Our goal in this paper is to present an assortment of these techniques in a common framework. We hope this will make the entire area more accessible.
We are typically concerned with the situation where we wish to prove a statement 1) about sufficiently large finite structures which 2) concerns the finite analogs of measure-theoretic notions such as density or integrals. The classic example of such a statement is Szemerédi's Theorem (other examples can be found later in the paper and in the references): Theorem 1.1 (Szemerédi's Theorem). For each ǫ > 0 and each k ∈ N >0 , there is an N such that whenever n > N and A ⊆ [1, n] := {1, . . . , n} with |A| n ≥ ǫ, there exist a, d such that a, a + d, a + 2d, . . . , a + (k − 1)d ∈ A.
Suppose this statement were false, and therefore that for some particular ǫ, some k, and infinitely many n, there were sets A n ⊆ [1, n] serving as counter-examples to the theorem. For each n, we could view the set [1, n] , together with the subset A n and the function + mod n, as a structure M n of Towsner's work was partially supported by NSF grant DMS-1001528.
1 first-order logic 1 . Using the ultraproduct construction 2 , these finite models can be assembled into a single infinite model M satisfying the Loś Theorem, which, phrased informally, states: Theorem 1.2. A first-order sentence is true in M if and only the sentence is true in M n for "almost every" n.
The existence of a and d satisfying the theorem can be expressed by a first-order sentence, so if we could show that this sentence was true in the infinite structure M, then the same sentence would be true in many of the finite structures M n , which would contradict our assumption.
In each of the finite models, we have a natural measure on [1, n] , namely the (normalized) counting measure µ n , and the assumption that |An| n ≥ ǫ is simply the statement that µ n (A n ) ≥ ǫ. We would like to produce a measure on M which satisfies some analog of the Loś theorem.
One way to accomplish this is to expand the language of our models with many new predicates, one for each definable set S and rational δ, and specify that the formula m S,δ holds in M n exactly if µ n (S) < δ. Then, for instance, the failure of m A,ǫ in the finite structures M n implies the failure of the same formula in M. With a bit of work, these new predicates are enough to ensure that we can construct a genuine measure, the Loeb measure (see [14] ), on the structure M whose properties are related to those of the finite structures via the Loś theorem.
In this paper, we define approximate measure logic, or AML, to be an extension of first-order logic in which these new predicates are always present. We emphasize that AML is a conservative extension of first-order logic: anything done in AML can be translated back into the usual first-order logic by simply adding new predicates (we describe this translation in detail in Section 6).
While these approaches are similar, the model theory of AML does not simply reduce to the model theory of first-order logic. The reason is that results which alter the signature of the language behave differently: when a new predicate is added to first-order logic expanded by predicates describing a measure, the new predicate is unmeasured. Part of the motivation for this paper is the hope that a precise formulation of AML will promote the study of the model theory of this logic. (In particular, we were motivated by the realization that the results of [7] do not automatically apply to AML.)
In general, a logic which intends to talk about measure has to make some kind of compromise, since there is a tension between talking about measures in a natural way and talking about the usual first-order notions (which, for instance, impose the presence of projections of sets). AML is not the first attempt at such a combination (see [24, 2] ), but differs because it stays much closer to conventional first-order logic. The main oddity, relative to what a 1 To keep this paper relatively self-contained, Appendix A gives a brief introduction to the parts of first-order logic used in this paper.
2 See Appendix B.
naive attempt at a logic for measures might look like, is that the description of measures in the logic is approximate: there can be a slight mismatch between which sentences are true in a structure and what is true about the actual measure. For instance, it is possible to have a structure M together with a measure µ so that M satisfies a sentence saying the measure of a set B is strictly less than ǫ while in fact the measure of B is precisely ǫ. This is necessary to accommodate the ultraproduct construction. The next three sections lay out the basic definitions of AML and describe some properties of structures of AML, culminating in the construction of ultraproducts which have well-behaved measures. In Section 5, we present two examples of simple applications, giving a proof of the Furstenberg correspondence between finite sets and dynamical systems, and a proof of the Szemerédi Regularity Lemma.
In Section 6, we describe the aforementioned translation of AML into firstorder logic and use it to prove a Downward Löwenheim-Skolem theorem for AML. In Section 7, we illustrate several useful model-theoretic techniques in AML and apply these to show a connection between definability, the model-theoretic notion of stability, and combinatorial quantities known as the Gowers uniformity norms. We intend this section to be a survey of methods that have proven useful. These methods are either more fully developed in the references, or await a fuller development.
Finally, in Section 8, we present axioms for AML and show that these axioms are sound and complete.
In this article, m and n range over N := {0, 1, 2, . . .}. For a relation R ⊆ X × Y , x ∈ X, and y ∈ Y , we set R x := {y ∈ Y : (x, y) ∈ R} and R y := {x ∈ X : (x, y) ∈ R}.
The authors thank Ehud Hrushovski and Terence Tao for helpful conversations on the topic of this E.
Syntax and Semantics
In this article, we let L Q ≥0 = {+, ·, <, 0, 1, (c q ) q∈Q ≥0 } denote the firstorder signature of ordered rings augmented by constant symbols for each element of Q ≥0 . We treat Q ≥0 as an L Q ≥0 -structure in the obvious way. A signature for approximate measure logic (AML) is nothing more than a first-order signature. Suppose that L is a first-order signature. In order to describe L-terms in AML, we first demand that there are only variables for the signature L. Then one forms terms as usual, by applying function symbols to constant symbols and (in the case of the signature L) variables. We let T h and T a denote the sets of L-terms and L Q ≥0 terms respectively. Observe that any term in T a actually names some element of Q ≥0 ; we will often identify a term with the nonnegative rational number that it names.
Definition 2.1. We define the L-formulae of AML as follows:
• Any first-order atomic L-formula and any first-order atomic (variablefree) L Q ≥0 -formula is an L-formula.
• The L-formulae are closed under the use of the usual connectives ¬ and ∧.
• If ϕ is an L-formula and x is a variable, then ∃xϕ and ∀xϕ are L-formulae.
• If x = (x 1 , . . . , x n ) is a sequence of distinct variables, t is a term in T a , ⊲⊳∈ {<, ≤}, and ϕ is an L-formulae, then m x ⊲⊳ t.ϕ is an L-formula.
The last constructor, which we will refer to as the measure constructor, in the above definition behaves like a quantifier in the sense that any of the variables x 1 , . . . , x n appearing free in ϕ become bound in the resulting formula.
From now on, ⊲⊳ will always denote < or ≤.
Convention 2.2. It will become convenient to introduce the following notations:
• m x ≥ t.ϕ is an abbreviation for ¬m x < t.ϕ
• m x > t.ϕ is an abbreviation for ¬m x ≤ t.ϕ Remark 2.3. It is not necessary that AML contain precisely one measure for each tuple length. A more general definition could allow multiple measures at each arity. In this case, one would also want to track which measures on pairs, for instance, correspond to the products of which measures on singletons, and so on. There are even situations where it is natural to have a measure on pairs which does not correspond to any product of measures on singletons. 3 Further generalizations could involve such things as measures valued in ordered rings. A fully general definition of AML would include in the signature L, for each arity, a list of measures together with the ordered ring in which they are valued. In this paper we eschew these complications and focus only on the simplest case, with a single real-valued measure; the changes needed to handle more general cases are largely routine.
We next describe L-structures in AML. An AML L-structure M will be a first-order L-structure with some additional information needed to define semantics for the measure constructor. The idea is that the intended structures M are naturally equipped with measures µ n on M n and these measures should tell us how to define the semantics of the measure quantifier; for example, if | x| = n, then m x ≤ r.ϕ should be true in M if and only if µ n ({ c ∈ M n : M |= ϕ( c)}) ≤ r. (Of course, the previous sentence assumes that the definable set in question is measurable.) However, in order to do some model theory, one needs to be able to perform certain model constructions, e.g. ultraproducts, and it is not immediately clear how to to 3 A typical example is the proofs in extremal graph theory of sparse analogs of density statements, as in the regularity lemma for sparse graphs [26] , where the counting measure on pairs is replaced by counting the proportion of pairs from some fixed (typically small) set of pairs. If the fixed set of pairs satisfies certain randomness properties, this measure cannot be viewed as any product measure.
turn measures on the factor models into a measure on the ultraproduct in a way that preserves the semantics.
Our solution is as follows: an AML prestructure M is a first-order Lstructure that further specifies a collection B M,n ⊲⊳r ⊆ P(M n ) for each r ∈ Q ≥0 , ⊲⊳∈ {<, ≤}, and n ≥ 1. One should think of the statement X ∈ B M,n <r as declaring that the "measure" of X ⊆ M n is < r. Of course, for this analogy to be accurate, the collection of B M,n ⊲⊳r should satisfy some further properties; this will lead us to the notion of an AML L-structure, which we describe shortly. However, we first want to describe the semantics of AML for an arbitrary prestructure. (This will be useful in Section 6.)
Suppose that M is an AML L-prestructure. Let V be the set of variables and suppose also that s : V → M is a function; we call such an s a valuation on M. Given any sequence of distinct variables v = (v 1 , . . . , v n ) and any sequence c = (c 1 , . . . , c n ) from M , we let s( c/ v) be the valuation obtained from s by redefining (if necessary) s at v i to take the value c i . As in firstorder logic, we inductively define the satisfaction relation M |= ϕ[s]. As usual, one defines the satisfaction relation by recursion on the complexity of formulae. One treats the atomic case as well as the connective and quantifier cases as in first-order logic. In order to specify the semantics of the measure constructor, suppose that ϕ is an AML L-formulae for which satisfaction has already been defined and suppose that x is a tuple of distinct variables with | x| = n. Then we declare M |= m x ⊲⊳ t.ϕ[s] if and only if there is
Remark 2.4. Observe that there is something constructive about the semantics of the new constructor m x in the sense that to show that M |= m x ⊲⊳ t.ϕ, the prestructure must specify a witness to this fact.
As is customary, we often write M |= ϕ( a) if ϕ( x) is a formula with free variables among x, s is a valuation for which s(x i ) = a i , and M |= ϕ[s]. If ϕ has no free variables, then ϕ is called a sentence. If T is a set of sentences, we write M |= T if and only if M |= ϕ for all ϕ ∈ T ; in this case, we say that M is a model of T .
Example 2.5. Let L be the signature consisting of a single binary function symbol · and a single constant symbol e. Let G be a group with |G| = m. We view G as a first-order L-structure G by interpreting · as multiplication in G and e as the identity of G. In order to view G as an AML L-prestructure, we must specify the sets B G,n ⊲⊳r . We do this by declaring, for X ⊆ G n , that X ∈ B G,n ⊲⊳r if and only if |X| m n ⊲⊳ r; this is analogous to equipping each cartesian power G n with the (normalized) counting measure. Now fix g ∈ G and let ϕ(x, y) be the first-order L-formula x · y = y · x. Then G |= m x < r.ϕ(g) if and only if the cardinality of C G (g), the centralizer of g in G, is < r · m. In particular, if r < 1, then G |= ∀ym x < r.ϕ as the centralizer of the identity has cardinality m.
An AML structure is an AML prestructure subject to some additional properties, which will be defined after some notation is set. Notation 2.6. Suppose that M is an AML prestructure.
•
Observe that we may now rewrite the semantics of the measure constructor by declaring that M |= m x ⊲⊳ r.ϕ[s] if and only if
As in classical logic, we say that D ⊆ M n is definable (in M) if there is a formula ϕ( x, y), with | x| = n, and a ∈ M | y| such that D = { x ∈ M n : M |= ϕ( x, a)}. In this case, we sometimes write D = ϕ(M n , a) or even D = ϕ(M, a). If A ⊆ M and the tuple a as above lies in A, we also say that
Definition 2.7. Suppose that M is an AML L-prestructure. Then M is an AML L-structure if and only if the collection of B M ⊲⊳r satisfy the following properties, for r 1 , r ′ 1 , r 2 , r ′ 2 ∈ Q ≥0 :
• (Products) Suppose that n 1 , n 2 ≥ 1 and n = n 1 + n 2 .
Convention 2.8. From now on, when we say that M is an L-(pre)structure, we mean that M is an L-(pre)structure of AML. We use fraktur letters M and N (sometimes decorated with subscripts) to denote prestructures. The corresponding roman letter denotes the underlying universe of the prestructure. (So, for example, the underlying universe of M will be M and the underlying universe of N i will be N i .) Likewise, L-formulae will always mean AML L-formulae. If we wish to consider a structure from classical first-order logic, then we will speak of a classical structure and denote it using calligraphic letters such as M. Likewise, we will speak of classical formulae.
Remark 2.9. There are further properties that one might want to consider on L-structures:
• (Monotonicity) For every r ∈ Q ≥0 and every n ≥ 1, B M,n ⊲⊳r = B M,n ⊲⊳r . The Monotonicity axiom is a harmless axiom to impose. Indeed, if M is any L-structure of AML, then one can take its "monotone closure" M mc ; this is defined by saying B ∈ B M mc ⊲⊳r if and only if B ∈ B M ⊲⊳r . It is easy to see that the identity map id : M → M mc is an elementary map (to be defined later), so preserves the truth of all formulae.
• (Invariance under permutation of coordinates) Suppose σ is a permutation of {1, . . . , n} and B ⊆ M n . Define σ(B) by declaring
Then we demand B ∈ B M,n ⊲⊳a ⇔ σ(B) ∈ B M,n ⊲⊳a . Since there are measures on M n that need not be invariant under coordinate permutation, it is not reasonable to require that this property hold in all structures.
Suppose that M and N are L-prestructures. A (weak) homomorphism is a map j : M → N which is a homomorphism of first-order structures and such that, for every r ∈ Q ≥0 and every B ∈ B M ⊲⊳r , we have j(B) ∈ B N ⊲⊳r . We say that M is a sub-prestructure of N if the inclusion map M ֒→ N is a homomorphism. An isomorphism is a bijective homomorphism whose inverse is also a homomorphism.
The notion of an elementary embedding between L-prestructures is the same as in first-order logic: j : M → N is an elementary embedding if, for any L-formula ϕ( x) and any tuple a from M , we have
A proof by induction on the complexity of formulae shows that isomorphisms are elementary embeddings. We say that M is a elementary sub-prestructure of N if M is a substructure of N and the inclusion map M ֒→ N is an elementary embedding.
Suppose L ′ is signature extending the signature L. Suppose that M is an L ′ -prestructure. Then the L-reduct of M, denoted M|L, is the Lprestructure obtained from M by "forgetting" to interpret symbols from L ′ \ L. We also refer to M as an expansion of M|L.
We say that the L-prestructure N is a modification of the L-prestructure M if M = N , M and N interpret the first-order structure in the same way, and B M ⊲⊳r ⊆ B N ⊲⊳r for each r ∈ Q ≥0 . Suppose that S is a set of L-formulae. Then we say that the modification is conservative with respect to S if the identity map M → M is an elementary embedding with respect to formulae from S.
3. The Canonical Measures on an ℵ 1 -saturated AML structure An extremely important source of AML structures are those that are equipped with a measure. Definition 3.1. A measured L-structure is an AML L-structure M such that there is a measure ν n on a σ-algebra B n of subsets of M n extending Def n (M ) such that:
(2) For each m, n ≥ 1, the measure ν m+n is an extension of the product measure ν m ⊗ ν n (3) (Fubini property) For every m, n ≥ 1 and B ∈ B m+n , we have (a) for almost all x ∈ M m , B x ∈ B n ; (b) for almost all y ∈ M n , B y ∈ B m ; (c) the functions x → ν n (B x ) are y → ν m (B y ) are ν m -and ν nmeasurable, respectively, and
For example, any finite L-structure equipped with its normalized counting measure is a measured structure; in fact, these structures (and their ultraproducts) are our primary examples of measured structures.
Even if an AML structure does not come equipped with a measure, often there is still a "natural" measure that can be placed on the structure, a process that we now describe. First, we say that an L-structure M is ℵ 1 -saturated if whenever n ≥ 1 and (D m : m ∈ N) is a family of definable subsets of M n with the finite intersection property, then m∈N D m = ∅. For example, any finite L-structure is ℵ 1 -saturated; many ultraproducts are also ℵ 1 -saturated. In this section, we will show that certain ℵ 1 -saturated AML structures can be equipped with a family of canonical measures, the so-called Loeb measures.
Suppose that M is an AML L-structure. We define
M,n ≤q }. Observe that p n is a finitely additive measure. Now further suppose that M is ℵ 1 -saturated and (A m : m ∈ N) is a family of definable subsets of M n for which m∈N A m is also definable. Then, by ℵ 1 -saturation, we have that m∈N A m = k m=0 A m for some k ∈ N. Consequently, p n | Def n (M ) is a pre-measure. Thus, by the Caratheodory extension theorem, there is a measure µ M,n := µ n : σ(Def n (M )) → [0, +∞] extending p n given by
Moreover, if p n |σ(Def n (M )) is σ-finite, then µ n is the unique measure on σ(Def n (M )) extending p n . Observe, however, that by ℵ 1 -saturation again, p n | Def n (M ) is σ-finite if and only if p n | Def n (M ) is finite (which occurs if and only if p 1 (M ) is finite by the product property). We refer to the family of measures (µ M,n ) as the canonical measures on M. Although they are defined for all ℵ 1 -saturated L-structures, we mainly consider them in the case when p 1 (M ) is finite, for then they are truly "canonical." Until further notice, we assume that p 1 | Def 1 (M ) is a finite pre-measure on Def 1 (M ) (and hence p n | Def n (M ) is a finite pre-measure on Def n (M ) for all n ≥ 1). Let σ(Def m (M )) ⊗ σ(Def n (M )) denote the product σ-algebra and µ m ⊗ µ n denote the product measure. Observe that σ(Def m (M )) ⊗ σ(Def n (M )) is generated by sets of the form A × B, with A ∈ Def m (M )) and B ∈ Def n (M )); since A × B ∈ Def m+n (M ) for such A, B, we have
contains all sets of the form A × B, where A ∈ Def m (M ) and B ∈ Def n (M ). One can easily check that E is a λ-class. Since the sets of the form A × B, where A ∈ Def m (M ) and B ∈ Def n (M ), form a π-class, we have, by the
(For the definitions of λ-and π-classes as well as the statement of the π-λ-theorem, see Section 17.A of [23] .) Consequently, we see that
We call an ℵ 1 -saturated L-structure whose canonical measures satisfy the Fubini property a Fubini structure. (The measurability of the functions in (3) always holds for the canonical measures, so really a Fubini structure is one where the displayed equation in the statement of the Fubini property is required to hold.) A Fubini structure, equipped with its canonical measures, is a measured L-structure.
The following situation is also important:
Suppose that M is a classical L-structure which is equipped with a family of measures ν n on a σ-algebra B n of subsets of M n such that ν m+n is an extension of ν m ⊗ ν n for all m, n ≥ 1. We call (M, (ν n )) a classical measured structure. Then we can turn M into an L-structure M by declaring, for B ⊆ M n , that B ∈ B M,n ⊲⊳r if and only if B ∈ B n and ν n (B) ⊲⊳ r. We call M the AML structure associated to (M, (ν n )). Remark 3.3. Suppose that M is an ℵ 1 -saturated L-structure with p 1 (M ) finite. Consider the family (µ n ) of canonical measures. Let M be the classical L-structure obtained from M by considering only the interpretations of the symbols in L. Then (M, (µ n )) is a classical measured structure. Let M ′ be the AML structure associated to (M, (µ n )). How do M and M ′ compare? Well, suppose that ϕ(x) is a classical L-formula and that
(Such phenomena can, and will, happen in ultraproducts, as we will see in later sections.) Thus, in some sense, M ′ is a "completion" of M.
We now briefly turn to the question of what our logic can say about these canonical measures. We present a couple of examples. Suppose that (X, S) is a measurable space such that {x} ∈ S for every x ∈ X. (This happens, for example, when (X, S) = (M n , σ(Def n (M )) for M an L-structure.) Then a measure µ on X is said to be continuous if µ({x}) = 0 for each x ∈ X.
≤q be such that a ∈ B q . Then µ 1 ({a}) = p 1 ({a}) = 0. Conversely suppose that µ 1 is a continuous measure and fix a ∈ M and q ∈ Q >0 . Then there is B q ∈ B M ≤q such that a ∈ B q . Then M |= m y ≤ q(a = y). Since a ∈ M is arbitrary, we have M |= ∀xm y ≤ q(x = y).
What we really proved is that there is a set Γ(x) consisting of L-formulae containing a single free variable x such that, for every L-structure M and every a ∈ M ,
In model-theoretic terms, the set of elements of µ 1 -measure 0 is uniformly type-definable in all ℵ 1 -saturated L-structures. Below, as a consequence of the ultraproduct construction, we will see that this set is not uniformly definable in all L-structures.
Here is another proposition along the same lines.
Proposition 3.5. There is a set T of AML sentences such that, for any ℵ 1 -saturated L-structure M with p 1 (M ) finite, M |= T if and only if µ 1 is a probability measure.
Proof.
There is a set T of AML sentences such that, for any ℵ 1 -saturated L-structure M with p 1 (M ) finite, M |= T if and only if M is a Fubini structure.
Proof. We take T to be the following scheme:
(ϕ ∧ ψ) for every ϕ( x, y, z), ψ( x, z), q, r, t. Note that ψ may not contain variables from y.
Suppose M T . It suffices to show that for any definable set B ⊆ M m+n , we have µ m+n (B) = µ n (B x )dµ m ( x). Fix a formula ϕ( x, y) so that B = {( x, y) ∈ M m+n : M ϕ( x, y)}. Given rationals r, r ′ , we set B r,r ′ = { x : M m y ≥ r.ϕ( x, y) ∧ m y < r ′ .ϕ( x, y)}; we will also write B r,r ′ as an abbreviation for its defining formula.
Observe that we can approximate the function x → µ n (B x ) by step functions of the form i r i χ Br i ,r i+1 for sequences of rationals r 1 < · · · < r k . Let r 1 < · · · < r k be such a sequence of rationals. For any rational
Since the B r i ,r i+1 are pairwise disjoint, it follows that µ m+n (B) ≥ i q i r i . Since we may choose q i , r i as above so that i q i r i is arbitrarily close to
Similarly, for any q i > µ m (B r i ,r i+1 ), we must have M m x ≤ q i .B r i ,r i+1 , and since M T , we also have
Now suppose M is Fubini; we must show that every sentence in T holds. For the first family of sentences, suppose
For the second family of sentences, suppose
M,m ≤q , and therefore
qr, and therefore for each t > qr we have
Remark 3.7. Fix T as in the proof of the previous proposition. The proof we have given above shows that M |= T for any measured structure M.
Ultraproducts
We suppose that the reader is familiar with the standard ultraproduct construction from first-order logic; the reader unfamiliar with this construction should consult Appendix B.
Suppose that (M i : i ∈ I) is a family of L-structures and suppose that U is an ultrafilter on I. We let M denote the classical ultraproduct of the family (M i ) with respect to U . We make M into an L-prestructure by declaring that B ∈ B M,n ⊲⊳r if and only if there is a sequence (B i : i ∈ I) such that B i ∈ B M i ,n ⊲⊳r for U -almost all i and such that B = U B i . The following theorem is of fundamental importance for our applications of AML.
is a family of L-structures, U is a nonprincipal ultrafilter on I, and M = U M i is the ultraproduct of the family (M i ). Let ϕ be an L-formula and s a valuation on M. For each i ∈ I, let s i be a valuation on M i such that, for each variable v, we have
Proof. The proof is by induction on the complexity of ϕ. The only new case to consider is the case of the measure constructor. In the remainder of this proof, we suppose that x is a tuple of distinct variables with
Then by the induction hypothesis, we have M |= ϕ[s( c/ x)] and yet c / ∈ B, which is a contradiction.
] and yet c i / ∈ B i ; this is a contradiction.
Proof. The Coherence and Emptiness properties are clear. We now prove the Finite Additivity property. Suppose that B ∈ B M ≤r and C ∈ B M ≤s . Write B = U B i and C = U C i . For the large set of i satisfying B i ∈ B M i ≤r
≤r+s . It is easy to see that this argument also covers the case that C ∈ B M <s and that this argument can easily be modified to prove the first half of the Product property.
Towards proving the second half of the Finite Additivity property, suppose that B ∈ B M ≥r ∩B M ≤r ′ and C ∈ B M ≥s ∩B M ≤s ′ and that B ∩C = ∅. Since B ∈ B M ≤r ′ , we can write
≥r+s , we have that B ∪ C ∈ B M ≥r+s . Again, this argument also covers the case that C ∈ B M >s and can be modified to prove the second half of the Product property.
If The following result is proven in the classical context in Appendix B; this proof carries over immediately to the framework of AML. Proposition 4.6. Suppose that U is a countably incomplete ultrafilter on a set I and suppose that L is countable. Suppose that
Consequently, an ultraproduct M for which p M,1 is finite can be equipped with its canonical family of measures. (Observe that, by the Loś theorem, p M,1 is finite if and only if p M i ,1 is finite for U -almost all i.) These measures are instrumental for our applications of AML to problems in finite combinatorics and ergodic theory.
We can also use the Los theorem to show that properties of the canonical measures on the factor models are inherited by the canonical measures on the ultraproduct. 
Proof. This is immediate from Proposition 3.6 and the Loś theorem.
is a continuous measure for almost all i. Suppose that U is a nonprincipal ultrafilter on I and M = U M i . Then µ M,1 is also a continuous measure.
Proof. This is immediate from Proposition 3.4 and the Loś theorem.
Remark 4.9. Under some set-theoretic assumptions, the converse of the above corollary holds. A nonprincipal ultrafilter U on a (necessarily uncountable) index set I is said to be countably complete if whenever (
With the same hypotheses as in the previous corollary, if we further assume that U is countably complete, then continuity of µ M,1 implies continuity of almost all µ M i ,1 . The existence of a countably complete ultrafilter is tantamount to the existence of a measurable cardinal, which is a fairly mild set-theoretic assumption that most set theorists are willing to assume when necessary. However, it is straightforward to check that if U is countably complete and each M i is finite, then U M i will also be finite, making such ultraproducts unusable for many purposes.
Corollary 4.10. There does not exist an L-formula ϕ(x) such that for every
Proof. Suppose, towards a contradiction, that such an L-formula ϕ(x) exists. For i ≥ 1, let M i be the classical measured L-structure whose universe is {1, . . . , i}, whose measures are given by the normalized counting measures, and which interprets the L-structure in an arbitrary fashion. Let M i be the AML L-structure associated with M i . Let U be a nonprincipal ultrafilter on N >0 and let
Also observe that p M,1 ({a}) = 0 for any a ∈ M by the Loś theorem. It follows that M |= ∀xϕ(x). By Loś again, we have that M i |= ∀xϕ(x) for some i ∈ N >0 . Since M i is ℵ 1 -saturated, it follows that each m ∈ M i has measure 0, which is a contradiction.
Corollary 4.11. There does not exist an L-sentence ϕ such that, whenever M is an ℵ 1 -saturated structure with µ 1 (M ) finite, then M |= ϕ if and only if µ 1 is a probability measure.
Proof. Suppose, towards a contradiction, that such a sentence ϕ exists. For
Consequently, µ 1 (M ) = 1, whence M |= ϕ. Thus, M n |= ϕ for some n, contradicting the fact that µ 1 (M n ) < 1.
Corollary 4.12. There does not exist a set T of L-sentences such that, for any L-structure M, M |= T if and only if p M,1 is σ-finite.
Proof. Suppose, towards a contradiction, that there is a set T of L-sentences such that M |= T if and only if p M,1 is σ-finite. Let M be a countably infinite set equipped with the unnormalized counting measure ν(B) = |B| and turn M into an AML L-structure M by interpreting the symbols in L in an arbitrary fashion. Note that M |= T because M is the union of its singletons, which are definable and have measure 1. Let U be a nonprincipal ultrafilter on N and let N := M U . Then, by the Loś theorem, we have that N |= T , so p N,1 is σ-finite. Since N is ω 1 -saturated, we have that µ 1,N is a finite measure. Thus, for some n ∈ N, N |= ¬∃x
, contradicting the fact that M contains infinitely many singletons of measure 1.
We now turn to the connection between integration and ultraproducts. First, we need a lemma. 
Proof. Fix q ∈ R >0 . We have
By the Loś theorem, the displayed statements are equivalent to the statement that there is r < q such that M i m x ≤ r.φ( x, a i ) for U -almost every i, which is in turn equivalent to p M i ,n (A i ) ≤ r for U -almost every i. Since this holds for every q ∈ R >0 , it follows that
is a family of L-structures and
are functions. We will say that the family (h i : i ∈ I) is uniformly definable if there exists a formula ϕ( x, y, z), where | x| = m and | x| = n, and tuples
we have that ϕ( x, y, c) defines a function h : M m → M n , which we call the ultraproduct of the uniformly definable family (h i ).
In the following theorem, the bound of 1 can easily be replaced by any positive real number. 4 For a family of real numbers (ri : i ∈ I), limU ri denotes the ultralimit of (ri); see Appendix B for more on this notion Theorem 4.14. Suppose that (M i : i ∈ I) is a family of measured Lstructures with
Suppose that U is a nonprincipal ultrafilter on I and M := U M i is equipped with its canonical measures (µ m ). For each i ∈ I, let g i : M n i → [−1, 1] be a measurable function. Then there is an expansion M ′ of M and a measurable (with respect to B M ′ ,n ) function g : M n → [−1, 1] such that, for every uniformly definable family (h i : i ∈ I) of functions of m variables with ultraproduct h, we have
is a uniformly definable family of functions, say defined by ϕ( x, y) (and some parameters, which we suppress for sake of exposition), with ultraproduct h. Set m := | x| and n := | y|. Fix c ∈ Q >0 and choose a partition
Then for each j < k, the sets S q j ,q j+1 i and S q j ,q j+1 are as in the hypothesis of Lemma 4.13, whence
). Since we have that
by taking ultralimits, we have
c . Letting c go to ∞, we have the desired result.
We call the function g as in the conclusion of the previous theorem the ultraproduct of the family (g i ). Observe that
We will particularly be interested in the case that I = N, in which case, using the same notation as in the statement of the previous theorem, if
Correspondence Theorems
5.1. The Furstenberg Correspondence Principle. One application of AML is to give a general framework for correspondence principles between finite structures and dynamical systems. We will only present a proof of the original correspondence argument given by Furstenberg [13] ; since then, many variations and generalizations have been produced (for instance, [5] ). The method given extends immediately to these generalizations.
is a probability space and T : Y → Y is a bimeasurable bijection for which
Furstenberg's original correspondence can be stated as follows:
. Let E ⊆ Z with positive upper Banach density be given. Then there is a dynamical system (Y, B, µ, T ) and a set A ∈ B with µ(A) = d(E) such that for any finite set of integers U ,
Proof. Let (ǫ N : N ∈ N) be an increasing sequence of positive rational numbers such that sup N ǫ N = d(E). Then for each N , we may find n, m such that m − n > N and
be the function such that f n,m (x) = x + 1 when x < m and f n,m (m) = n. We consider the classical measured structure ([n, m], E ∩ [n, m], f n,m ) equipped with the counting measure and consider the corresponding AML structure M n,m .
Let (Y, A, T ) be the ultraproduct of the M n,m 's with respect to some nonprincipal ultrafilter on N. Let B := σ(Def 1 (Y )) and let µ be the canonical measure on B. It is clear from Loś' theorem that (Y, B, µ, T ) is a dynamical system. Next observe that, by our construction, µ(A) = d(E). Now notice that, for any finite set of integers U , any rational δ < µ( i∈U T −i A), and any N , we may find m, n such that m − n > N and
Fix γ > 0. Then for sufficiently large N , we also have that
5.2. The Regularity Lemma. In addition to the σ-algebras B n described above, it is useful to have certain sub-σ-algebras.
Definition 5.4. Let M be an AML structure, let A ⊆ M be a set, let n be a positive integer, and let I ⊆ [1, n] be given. We define B 0 n,I (A) to be the Boolean algebra of subsets of M n of the form
where ϕ is a formula with parameters from A whose free variables belong to I.
When k ≤ n, we define B 0 n,k (A) to be the Boolean algebra generated by the algebras B 0 n,I (A) as I ranges over subsets of [1, n] of cardinality k. In all cases, we drop 0 to indicate the σ-algebra generated by the algebra. When A = ∅, we omit it and write B n,k .
These algebras were introduced, in a somewhat different context, by Tao in [29, 30] .
Definition 5.5. Suppose that (G, E) is a finite (undirected) graph, U, U ′ ⊆ G are nonempty, and ǫ is a positive real number.
Theorem 5.6 (Szemerédi's Regularity Lemma, [28] ). For any k and any ǫ > 0, there is a K ≥ k such that whenever (G, E) is a finite graph, there is an n ∈ [k, K] and a partition G = U 1 ∪ · · · ∪ U n such that, setting B = {(i, j) : U i and U j are not ǫ-regular}, we have
Proof. For a contradiction, suppose the conclusion fails. Then we may find k, ǫ such that for every K ≥ k there is a finite graph (G K , E K ) with no partition into at least k but at most K components satisfying the theorem. The partition of a graph into singleton elements consists entirely of ǫ-regular pairs, so in particular
where E is a binary predicate symbol. Inductively assume that AML signatures L 0 ⊆ L 1 ⊆ L 2 ⊆ · · · have been constructed. Then for any two AML L n -formulae ϕ(x) and ψ(x), at least one of which does not belong to n−1 i=1 L i , with only the displayed free variable, we add new unary predicates R ϕ,ψ (x) and S ϕ,ψ (x) to L n+1 . We let L := ∞ n=1 L n . We define finite measured L-structures G K as follows:
• The universe of G K is G K ;
• The measures on G K are given by the counting measure;
• E is interpreted in G K by E K ; and • R ϕ,ψ , S φ,ψ are interpreted by induction on formulas. Having interpreted ϕ, ψ, we may set U = ϕ(G K ) and
. . , U n be the atoms of the finite algebra generated by {C i } ∪ {D i }. Then we have
Let B be the collection of (i, j) such that R U i ,U j (and therefore S U i ,U j ) are non-empty, and for each (i, j) ∈ B, define
We may assume µ( (i,j)∈B + U i × U j ) ≥ ǫ/4 (for otherwise we carry out a similar argument with B \ B + ).
Again by Loś' theorem, for each (i,
But this is a contradiction, since
Note that what we have constructed a partition of G which roughly satisfies the regularity conditions, but in the infinite model. Our final step is to pull this partition down to give a finite model, giving a contradiction. By choosing K ≥ n large enough, we may ensure that the following hold:
• Whenever (i, j) ∈ B, R
Remark 5.7. The regularity lemma is usually stated with an additional requirement that the cardinalities of the partition pieces be nearly equal. This could be obtained with the following changes: for each integer n, include new unary predicates P n,1 , . . . , P n,n in the language, and in the finite models interpret these predicates as a partition into nearly equal pieces. Using these predicates, refine the partition {U i } into one where the components have nearly the same measure. When we pull this down to the finite model, the sets will differ in size by a very small fraction (choosing parameters correctly, this fraction can be arbitrarily small, say ǫ 2 ), so we may redistribute a small number of points to make these pieces have exactly the same size without making much change to the edge density of large subsets.
Remark 5.8. The method in this subsection extends very naturally to hypergraphs, using the algebras B k,k−1 in place of B 2,1 . The details will be given in a future paper.
The First-Order Translation and the Downward Löwenheim-Skolem Theorem
There is a natural way to view an AML L-structure as a classical structure in a language L * extending L in a way that preserves the semantics. We
is a classical L-formula, then set ψ * := ψ. Now suppose that this has been carried out to stage n. Given an L n -formula ϕ( x; y) and a term t ∈ T a , we add | y|-ary predicates R ϕ,t and S ϕ,t to L n+1 . We define (R ϕ,t ( y)) * := m x ≤ t.ϕ * ( x, y) and (S ϕ,t ( y)) * := m x < t.ϕ * ( x, y).
By defining (∃xψ) * := ∃x(ψ * ), (ψ 1 ∧ ψ 2 ) * := ψ * 1 ∧ ψ * 2 , and (¬ψ) * := ¬ψ * , we can uniquely define ψ * for each L n+1 -formula ψ.
Set L * := n L n . Observe that |L * | = |L| + ℵ 0 . Given an AML Lformula ϕ( x), one can define a classical L-formula ϕ * ( x) by induction on the complexity of ϕ. First, define the rank of an AML L-formula ϕ, denoted rk(ϕ), by induction:
(1) If ϕ is a classical L-formula, then rk(ϕ) = 0; (2) rk(¬ϕ) = rk(∀xϕ) = rk(ϕ); (3) rk(ϕ ∨ ψ) = max(rk(ϕ), rk(ψ)); (4) rk(m x ⊲⊳ r.ϕ( x, y)) = rk(ϕ) + 1. Now if rk(ϕ) = 0, that is, if ϕ is a classical formula, set ϕ * := ϕ. Now given an AML L-formula ϕ of rank n, we inductively assume that ϕ * has been defined in such a way that ϕ * is a classical L n -formula. In this case, we set (m x ≤ t.ϕ( x; y)) * := R ϕ * ,t ( y), which is a classical L n+1 -formula. One proceeds similarly with the constructor for < and the predicate S. One treats connectives and quantifiers as in the previous paragraph. Observe that if ϕ and ψ are an AML L-formula and a classical L * -formula respectively, then ϕ = ϕ * * and ψ = ψ * * ; observe also that the rank of ψ * is equal to the least n such that ψ is an L n -formula. Now given an AML L-prestructure M, we consider the classical L * -structure M * whose universe M is the same as the universe of M and so that, for an L n -formula ϕ( x; y), term t ∈ T a , and a ∈ M | y| , we have
The following lemma is elementary.
We now aim towards proving the following important model-theoretic fact: We will use the first-order translation to prove the preceding theorem. First, by replacing N with its monotone closure, we may as well assume that N satisfies the Monotonicity property (see Remark 2.9). Let M † be an L * -elementary substructure of N * containing A such that |M † | ≤ max(|A|, |L|+ ℵ 0 ); this is possible by the Downward Löwenheim-Skolem theorem from firstorder logic (see [6] ) and the fact that
The desired AML L-structure will have universe M = M † . We first make M into a L-prestructure M 0 by setting B M 0 ⊲⊳r := ∅ for each r ∈ Q ≥0 . The specification of B M will be done through a sequence of modifications M 0 , M 1 , M 2 , . . . The sequence will be constructed so that M n+1 is conservative over M n with respect to formulae of rank ≤ n. We define a modification M 1 of M 0 as follows: for any classical L-formula ϕ( x; y) and a ∈ M | y| , we put {x ∈ M | x| : M |= ϕ( x, a)} ∈ B M 1 ⊲⊳r if and only if {x ∈ N | x| : N |= ϕ( x, a)} ∈ B N ⊲⊳r . It is clear that M 1 is a conservative extension of M 0 with respect to classical formulae. Now suppose that n > 0 and the sequence of modifications has been constructed up to M n−1 . We now construct a modification M n of M n−1 which is conservative with respect to formulae of rank ≤ n − 1. If ϕ( x, y) is an L-formula of rank n − 1, we put { x ∈ M : N |= ϕ( x, a)} ∈ B Mn ⊲⊳r if and only if:
• {x ∈ N | x| : N |= ϕ( x, a)} ∈ B N ⊲⊳r • for every formula ψ( x, z) of rank < n − 1 and every b ∈ M | z| , whenever
Claim 1: M n is a conservative modification of M n−1 with respect to formulae of rank ≤ n − 1. Proof of Claim 1: Clearly M n is a conservative modification of M n−1 with respect to formulae of rank 0. Now inductively assume that M n is a conservative modification of M n−1 with respect to formulae of rank at most m, where m < n − 1, and suppose that ϕ( x, y) has rank m. We must check that M n |= m x ⊲⊳ r.ϕ( x, a) ⇔ M n−1 |= m x ⊲⊳ r.ϕ( x, a). First suppose that M n−1 |= m x ⊲⊳ r.ϕ( x, a), so
But the left-hand side of the display is {x ∈ M : M n |= ϕ( x, a)}, whence M n |= m x ⊲⊳ r.ϕ( x, a). Now suppose that M n |= m x ⊲⊳ r.ϕ( x, a). Then
Without loss of generality, we may suppose that
Mn ⊲⊳r , where rk(ψ) = n − 1. However, since rk(ϕ) = m < n − 1, by the choice of B Mn ⊲⊳r , we have { x ∈ M : M n−1 |= ϕ( x, a)} ∈ B
M n−1 ⊲⊳r . This finishes the proof of Claim 1.
We now make M into an L-prestructure M by setting B M ⊲⊳r := n B Mn ⊲⊳r .
Claim 2: For all formulae ϕ( x, y) and a ∈ M , if rk(ϕ) = k, then M |= ϕ( a) if and only if M k |= ϕ( a).
Proof of Claim 2:
We prove this by induction on k. When k = 0, this is clear. Now suppose that this is true for k − 1, where k > 0, and suppose that ϕ( x) = m y ⊲⊳ r.ψ( x, y), where rk(ψ) = k − 1. First suppose that
Since M k is conservative over M k−1 with respect to formulae of rk ≤ k − 1, we have that { y ∈ M : M k |= ψ( a, y)} = { y ∈ M : M k−1 |= ψ( a, y)}; by the induction hypothesis, we have { y ∈ M : M k−1 |= ψ( a, y)} = { y ∈ M : M |= ψ( a, y)}. This shows that M |= ϕ( a). Conversely, suppose that M |= ϕ( a). Then { y ∈ M : M |= ψ( a, y)} ⊆ B ∈ B M ⊲⊳r . Without loss of generality, we may suppose that B ∈ B M l , where l ≥ k. By induction, we have { y ∈ M : M |= ψ( a, y)} = { y ∈ M : M k−1 |= ψ( a, y)}; since M l is conservative over M k−1 with respect to formulae of rank ≤ k − 1, we have
Since M l is conservative over M k with respect to formulae of rank ≤ k, we have M k |= ϕ( a). This finishes the proof of Claim 2.
Claim 3: For any formula ϕ( x) and any a ∈ M , we have
Proof of Claim 3: We prove this by induction on rk(ϕ). First observe that if ( * ) holds, then
Thus proving ( * ) for all formulae ϕ is sufficient to prove that M is an elementary sub-prestructure of N. Now if rk(ϕ) = 0, then ( * ) is clear. Suppose now that we know that ( * ) holds when rk(ϕ) ≤ m and consider ϕ( x) = m y ≤ r.ψ( x, y), where rk(ψ) = m. First suppose that M * |= ϕ * ( a), so M |= m y ⊲⊳ r.ψ( a, y). Then
⊲⊳r , where b ∈ M and N |= m y ⊲⊳ r.χ( y, b). By Claim 2,
Suppose now that rk(χ) ≤ rk(ψ). Then by the induction hypothesis and ( * * ), we have M |= ∀ y(ψ( a, y) → χ( y, b)); since quantifiers and connectives do not increase rank, we have N |= ∀ y(ψ( a, y) → χ( y, b)) by another application of ( * * ). It follows that N |= m y ⊲⊳ r.ψ( a, y), that is, N * |= ϕ * ( a), whence M † |= ϕ * ( a). Now suppose that rk(ψ) < rk(χ). Then by the definition of B M , we have that { y ∈ M : M |= ψ( a, y)} ∈ B M ⊲⊳r , whence N * |= ϕ * ( a) and hence M † |= ϕ * ( a). Now suppose that M † |= ϕ * ( a), so N |= m y ≤ r.ψ( a, y). Towards this end, we need to show that {x ∈ M | x| : M |= ψ( a, x)} ∈ B M m+1 ⊲⊳r . We must show that if χ( y, z) has rank < m and { y ∈ M : M m |= χ( y, b)} ⊆ { y ∈ M : N |= ψ( a, y)}, then { y ∈ M : M m |= χ( y, b)} ∈ B Mm ⊲⊳r . This is done by induction on rk(χ). First suppose that rk(χ) = 0. In this case, we have N |= ∀ y(χ( y, b) → ψ( a, y)), so we have {x ∈ M | x| : M |= χ( x, b)} ∈ B M 1 ⊲⊳r . We now proceed inductively. Suppose this is true for ranks ≤ k and suppose that rk(χ) = k + 1 < m. We still have {x ∈ N | x| : N |= χ( x, b)} ∈ B N ⊲⊳r . Suppose that rk(χ ′ ) < rk(χ) and
⊲⊳r . This finishes the proof of Claim 3.
An extremely useful consequence of the elementarity of M in N is the following: Given a formula ϕ( x, y) and a ∈ M , we have {x ∈ M | x| : M |= ϕ( x, a)} ∈ B M ⊲⊳r if and only if {x ∈ N | x| : N |= ϕ( x, a)} ∈ B N ⊲⊳r . One proves this result by induction on the rank of ϕ. Equipped with this fact, it is easy to verify that M is an AML structure. For example, to see that M satisfies the first half of the Finite Additivity property, suppose that {x ∈ M | x| : M |= ϕ i ( x, a i )} ∈ B M ≤r i , i = 1, 2, and let r := r 1 + r 2 . Then we have {x ∈ N | x| : N |= ϕ i ( x, a i )} ∈ B N ≤r i , for i = 1, 2; since N is an AML structure satisfying the Monotonicity property, we have that {x ∈ N | x| : N |= ϕ 1 ( x, a 1 ) ∨ ϕ 2 ( x, a 2 )} ∈ B N ≤r . By our observation, we see
This finishes the proof of Theorem 6.2.
Model Theory and Applications
7.1. More Model Theory. We introduce some standard (and less standard) notions from model theory. We often discuss the case where the language is countable, M is ℵ 1 -saturated, and we consider a countable substructure, since this is the most interesting case for our purposes. Most of these results would still hold as long as the saturation of M is greater than the cardinality of either the signature or the submodels we consider. From now on, we fix a countable signature L and a measured L-structure M (although Lemmas 7.11, 7.10, and 7.13 below make no mention of the measure and thus these Lemmas go through for an arbitrary L-structure). For example, M could be a Fubini structure equipped with its canonical measures. Also, for sake of readability, we will write µ for the measure, regardless of the cartesian power of M n under discussion. Finally, we will often identify a formula ϕ(x) with parameters from M with the subset of M n that it defines; in this way, we may write µ(ϕ) to denote the measure of the definable subset of M n defined by ϕ. Likewise, we may write ¬Y to indicate the complement of the definable set Y . (1) A partial type of n-tuples (or an n-type) over A is a collection p( x) of formulae with parameters from A, where x = (x 1 , . . . , x n ), such that for every ϕ 1 , . . . , ϕ n ∈ p, there is a ∈ M n such that M |= ϕ i ( a) for every i ≤ n. (2) A partial type p is said to be a type over A if for every formula φ with suitable free variables and parameters from A, either φ ∈ p or ¬φ ∈ p. (3) A global type is a type over M . (4) If a is a sequence of elements, we write tp( a/A) for the set of formulas with parameters from A satisfied by a. (5) If M is measured, then the partial type p is wide if for every ϕ ∈ p, µ(ϕ) > 0.
2. An L-structure M is ℵ 1 -saturated if and only if, whenever A ⊆ M is countable and p( x) is a partial type over A, there is a ∈ M | x| such that M |= ϕ( a) for all ϕ ∈ p. In this case, we write a |= p.
Lemma 7.3. Suppose that A ⊆ M is countable. Then for almost every a, tp( a/A) is wide.
Proof. Any a such that tp( a/A) is not wide must belong to some set of measure 0 definable with parameters from A. There are countably many such sets, so their union has measure 0. That is, for every n there is a type p n of r · (n + 1)-tuples such that tp( b m 0 , . . . , b mn /M ) = p n whenever m 0 < · · · < m n is an increasing sequence.
7.2.
Amalgamation. The arguments in this section are essentially derived from [21] . Lemma 7.6. Suppose that µ(M ) is finite, ( b i ) is a sequence of indiscernibles over A ⊆ M , X is a definable set over A, and µ(X b 0 ) > 0 holds. Then for any n, µ( i≤n X b i ) > 0.
Proof. Suppose the conclusion of the lemma is false and take k > 0 minimal so that µ( i≤k
. This is a contradiction since µ is a finite measure. Remark 7.8. The previous lemma suggests a connection between wideness and the model-theoretic notion of nonforking, as we now explain. First, a formula ϕ(x, b) k-divides over a set A ⊆ M if there is a sequence (b i : i ∈ N) which is indiscernible over A for which b 0 = b and such that i∈I ϕ(M, b i ) = ∅ for any I ⊆ N with |I| = k. We say that ϕ(x, b) divides over A if it kdivides over A for some k ≥ 2. We say that ϕ(x, b) forks over A if there are formulae ψ 1 (x, b 1 
Finally, we say that a type p(x) forks over A if it contains a formula which forks over A. In model theory, when tp(a/A ∪ {b}) does not fork over A, this implies that a is in some sense independent from b over A. For example, when working in an algebraically closed field K and k is a subfield of K, then tp(a/k ∪ {b}) does not fork over k if and only if, whenever a is a generic point for a Zariski closed set V defined over k, then a does not lie in any Zariski closed set V ′ defined over k(b) with dim(V ′ ) < dim(V ). Lemma 7.7 shows that if A ⊆ M is countable and tp(a/A ∪ {b}) is wide, then tp(a/A ∪ {b}) does not fork over A. Definition 7.9. Suppose that A ⊆ M and p is a global type.
(1) p is A-invariant if whenever tp( a 1 , . . . , a n /A) = tp( a ′ 1 , . . . , a ′ n /A), X and a 1 , . . . , a n , a ′ 1 , . . . , a ′ n so that X a 1 ,..., an ∈ p and X a ′ 1 ,..., a ′ n ∈ p. Since p is a global type, this means ¬X a ′ 1 ,..., a ′ n ∈ p, and since p is closed under intersections, X a 1 ,..., an \X a ′ 1 ,..., a ′ n ∈ p. But then there is an element m ∈ A such that m ∈ X a 1 ,..., an \ X a ′ 1 ,..., a ′ n , contradicting the fact that tp( a 1 , . . . , a n /A) = tp( a ′ 1 , . . . , a ′ n /A).
Lemma 7.11. Let N be an elementary substructure of M. If p is a type over N , then there is an extension of p to a global N -finitely satisfiable (and therefore N -invariant) type.
Proof. Note that, since N is an elementary submodel of M, each X ∈ p has the property that X ∩ N n = ∅. Let
We will show that every finite subset of p ′ is satisfied by an element of N . If not, there is an X ∈ p and Y 1 , . . . , Y n with
Let q be an arbitrary extension of p ′ to a (global) type. Suppose q is not finitely satisfiable in M ; then there is a Y ∈ q with Y ∩ N = ∅, which is impossible since then ¬Y ∈ p ′ ⊆ q. Definition 7.12. If S is a set and p a global type, write p : S for the restriction of p to sets definable over S. 
Proof of Claim: Suppose the claim is false. Let p = tp( a/A). Then the partial type
is finitely satisfiable (and hence satisfiable by ℵ 1 -saturation). Indeed, given n ≥ 1, we can find a * |= tp( a/A) and 
and therefore by Lemma 7.7 and ℵ 1 -saturation we may find an a n+1 with tp( a n+1 /A) = tp( a/A) such that µ(X a n+1
by Lemma 7.13, we have ensured that ( b i ) remains indiscernible over A.
. This is a contradiction to the finiteness of µ(M ).
is wide, X, Y are definable with parameters from A, and and
Proof. Suppose the claim fails, so µ(X a ′ ∩ Y b ′ ) > 0. As in the proof of the previous lemma, we may assume that b = b ′ . Suppose that { a i , b i } i<n has been constructed (including the empty case where n = 0) so that a i |= tp( a/A) for each i and so that ( b i ) is indiscernible over A. Choose b n q :
There is some ǫ ∈ Q >0 such that for each C ∈ tp( a/A),
and therefore by Lemma 7.7 and ℵ 1 -saturation we may find an a n with tp( a n /A) = tp( a/A) such that µ( 
Proof. Fix an extension q ′ of q to an N -invariant global type; this is possible by Lemma 7.11. Let a * p and 
R is stable over N if whenever ( a i , b i ) is a sequence of indiscernibles over N and R( a i , b j ) holds for every i < j, also R( a j , b i ) for some i < j.
We say R ∈ B 2 (N ) is approximated by definable stable sets (ADS) (respectively, approximated by definable wide-stable sets (ADWS)) over N if for every ǫ > 0, there is a stable (respectively, wide-stable) set S definable over N such that µ(R△S) < ǫ.
Observe that the wide-stable subsets of M 2m form a σ-algebra. It can be shown that stable subsets of M 2m form a Boolean algebra. Note that if we replace wideness in the definition of wide-stability with non-forking, we obtain a standard consequence of stability (see Lemma 3.3 of [25] ). In particular, since wide types are non-forking, stable implies wide-stable. Theorem 7.18. Let M be ℵ 1 -saturated, let N be a countable elementary substructure of M, and suppose µ is finite. If R ⊆ M 2 is in B 2 (N ), then the following are equivalent:
(1) There is U ∈ B 2,1 (N ) such that µ(R△U ) = 0; (2) R is ADS; (3) R is ADWS.
(1) ⇒ (2): First observe that every set of the form A × B with A, B definable over N , is stable: if (a i , b i : i ∈ I) is a sequence of indiscernibles over N and (a i , b j ) ∈ A × B for i < j then (a j , b i ) ∈ A × B for all i < j. Consequently, the algebra generated by the sets of the form A×B, with A, B definable over N , which is dense in B 2,1 (N ), is contained in the algebra of stable subsets of M 2 . Thus, if there is U ∈ B 2,1 (N ) such that µ(R△U ) = 0, then for every ǫ > 0, there is S ∈ B 0 2,1 (N ) such that µ(R△S) < ǫ; such an S is stable.
(2) ⇒ (3): Immediate since stable definable sets are wide-stable and definable.
(3) ⇒ (1): Let R ⊆ M 2 be definable over N and wide-stable over N . Since B 2,1 (N ) is complete with respect to the pseudometric µ(·△·), it suffices to prove (1) for such an R. For any N -definable A and B and any ǫ > 0, define
Clearly U = U belongs to B 2,1 (N ) and satisfies µ(U \ R) = 0. Suppose, towards a contradiction, that µ(R \ U ) > 0. Then we may find an (a, b) ∈ R \ U such that tp(a/N ) and tp(b/N ∪ {a}) are wide. For each A ∈ tp(a/N ) and B ∈ tp(b/N ), we have A × B ∈ U , and therefore
We claim this is also a wide partial type. Towards this end, fix A and B definable over N such that a ∈ A and b ∈ B. Also fix S(x, y) definable over N so that, for each ǫ ∈ Q >0 , m y < ǫ.S(x, y) ∈ p. Since (a, b) / ∈ U , we have some ǫ ∈ Q >0 such that A B ǫ ∈ tp(a/N ). Set
Observe that A ′ ∈ tp(a/N ), whence µ(A ′ ) > 0. It is enough to show that µ((A ′ × B) ∩ (¬R ∩ ¬S)) > 0. Suppose this is not the case. Then
However, We could generalize these notions to stable relations on pairs of n-tuples, by using the two algebras B 2n, [1,n] and B 2n,[n+1,2n] (the algebras of sets of 2n-tuples depending only on the first n or only on the second n coordinates, respectively); the arguments are exactly analogous, replacing the singletons with n-tuples.
Combining Theorem 7.16 and the proof of the previous theorem, we see:
Suppose that N is a countable elementary substructure of N and that X and Y are definable over
differs from an element of B 2,1 by a null set.
7.3. Triangle Removal. We now give a proof of the triangle removal lemma for graphs [27] , a natural application of these methods since it was one of the original applications of Szemerédi's regularity lemma. The proof here is related to the infinitary proof (of the full hypergraph removal theorem) given by Tao [29] in a different framework. With a bit more effort, this proof also extends to hypergraphs (see [32] ). Suppose B is the σ-algebra generated by some collection of formulas with parameters from an elementary substructure M of N. Two natural ways to extend B would be by extending the collection of formulas and by extending the set M . The following lemma states that these two methods are orthogonal in a certain sense. This lemma will be applied in the particular case of the algebras B 2,1 (M ), B 2,1 (M ∪ {a}), and B 2 (M ) (as defined in Definition 5.4), and the reader will not be mislead assuming these are the algebras used. (Recall our notation that B 0 is the Boolean algebra of definable sets generating the algebra B.) Lemma 7.20. Let Φ be a set of formulas, let M be an elementary substructure of N, and let n be an integer. Suppose A 0 is the collection of sets of the form φ(N n , a) where φ( x, y) ∈ Φ and a ∈ M | y| , B 0 is the set of M -definable sets of n-tuples in N, and C 0 is the collection of sets of the form φ(N n , a) where φ( x, y) ∈ Φ and a ∈ N | y| .
Then for any
Proof. 5 Suppose not. Then setting ǫ := ||f − E(f | A)|| L 2 and δ := ||f − E(f | C)|| L 2 , we must have δ < ǫ. Since f is B-measurable, for some β 1 , . . . , β m , some ψ 1 , . . . , ψ m , and some 5 Hrushovski has pointed out that this proof is reminiscent of early proofs in the stability theory of algebraically closed fields. The full connection between this argument and the amalgamation methods from the previous section is not completely understood. and therefore
This is not itself a formula, but we can construct a formula which corresponds to it.
Squaring both sides and expanding the product, we have
For each i ≤ m, j ≤ k, we may choose an r ij such that
, and we may choose these so that
is measurable with respect to A, this contradicts the
The following theorem is essentially the infinitary version of triangle removal: if A 1 , A 2 , A 3 are sets of pairs, viewed as the sets of edges which could make up the legs of a triangle, and whenever we remove definable sets from each group of edges, we still leave a triangle, then the set of triangles has positive measure. We will want to think of sets of pairs, like A 1 , A 2 , A 3 , as sets of triples depending only on two coordinates. For the remainder of this section, if C is a set of pairs and 1 ≤ i < j ≤ 3, write 
Let us define 
by the preceding lemma. Since this holds for every x 3 , we have
We can now repeat this, applying it to A 2 and A 3 (note that this argument only used that χ A 2 , χ A 3 were measurable-their definability was not usedso the same argument goes through with g 12 1 replacing χ A 1 ), whence we have
(Unsurprisingly, there is some resemblance to the infinitary proof of the regularity lemma.) Note that δ 16
Since D is finite, it is atomic and the definable setsÃ i must have the form
, where the C j,i , D j,i are atoms of D. By removing a set of measure 0, we may assume that µ(C j,i ), µ(D j,i ) > 0. By assumption, there is an (x, y, z) ∈Ã 12 1 ∩Ã 13 2 ∩Ã 23 3 . This means that, for some j 1 , j 2 , j 3 , we have (x, y) ∈ C j 1 ,1 × D j 1 ,1 , (x, z) ∈ C j 2 ,2 × D j 2 ,2 , and (y, z) ∈ C j 3 ,3 × D j 3 ,3 . Since these are all atoms, we have Corollary 7.22. For each ǫ > 0, there is a δ > 0 such that whenever (G, E) is a graph with at most δ|G| 3 triangles, it is possible to remove at most ǫ|G| 2 edges to obtain a triangle-free graph.
Proof. Suppose not. Then for some ǫ and each K, there is a graph (G K , E K ) with at most |G| 3 /K triangles such that every subgraph with at least |E K |− ǫ|G K | 2 edges contains a triangle.
We consider a signature of AML consisting of a binary predicate E. We consider finite measured structures M K defined as follows:
• The universe of M K is G K , • The measures on M K are given by the counting measure, • E is interpreted by E K . Let M be a (nonprincipal) ultraproduct of these structures. Note that, in M, we have µ(E 12 ∩ E 13 ∩ E 23 ) = 0. By the preceding theorem, we can find definable sets B 1 , B 2 , B 3 such that µ 2 (E \ B i ) < ǫ/3 for each i ≤ 3 and B 12 1 ∩ B 13 2 ∩ B 23 3 = ∅. Note that saying this intersection of definable sets is empty is expressed by a single formula, and is therefore true for most of the structures (G K , E K ). But then, for some K,
is a triangle-free subgraph obtained by removing fewer than ǫ|G K | 2 triangles, yielding a contradiction.
Gowers Norms.
Definition 7.23. Let G be a finite abelian group and consider g : G → R. We define the k-th Gowers uniformity norm, || · || U k , by
It is not immediate that the right-hand side of the above display is nonnegative; however, this can be derived using an argument similar to that in the proof of Lemma 7.26 below.
The Gowers norms were introduced by Gowers in his proof of Szemerédi's Theorem [15] . Since then, the norms have proven to be powerful tools in combinatorics; for instance, these norms have been used to give a proof of the hypergraph regularity lemma [16] and in the proof of the Green-Tao theorem on arithmetic progressions in the primes [18] . Related norms for dynamical systems, the Gowers-Host-Kra norms, we introduced by Host and Kra [20] , and have similarly been used to prove recurrence theorems in dynamical systems (for a few examples, see [3, 8] ; [11] describes the general method and cites more than twenty examples).
Roughly speaking, the U 2 norm is large when a function has a large correlation with some group character. The U k norms for larger k are large when a function correlates with a canonical function of a more general type. The exact characterization of these canonical functions was a substantial project [17, 19] . Here we show that, in the setting of AML, these canonical functions can be taken to be the simple functions generated by algebras B k,k−1 .
In the infinite setting, we give a slightly more general definition: Definition 7.24. Let M be a measured AML structure and let f : M k → R be bounded and B k -measurable. Define || · || U k ∞ by:
Suppose further that + is a definable group operation on M and g : M → R is bounded. Then define f :
Note that in the infinite setting, these are seminorms (and not even a seminorm for k = 1).
Lemma 7.25. Let (G i : n ∈ N) be a sequence of finite abelian groups viewed as classicaly measured structures with the counting measure and let G i be the AML structure associated with G i . For each i, let g i : G i → [−1, 1] be a function such that lim i→∞ ||g i || U k exists. Let U be a nonprincipal ultrafilter on N, let G := U G n , and let g : G → [−1, 1] be the ultraproduct of (g i ).
which is easily seen by making the substitutions x = i h 0 i and
. Then the lemma follows from Theorem 4.14 (applied to (g ′ i ) and (j i )) and the remark following it. For the rest of this subsection, we fix f : M → R which is bounded and B k -measurable. We further assume that each µ k is a probability measure on B k .
Lemma 7.26.
Proof. Using Fubini's theorem, we have
By Cauchy-Schwarz and Fubini again, we have
Repeating this process, we arrive at
Proof. It suffices to show that 0 ≤ ||f
for a single I. Without loss of generality, we assume
which in turn expands into a sum of 2 2 k terms of the form
where each S ω is either χ B I or χ B I . Observe that f 2 k U k ∞ corresponds to the term when each S ω = χ B I . Thus, it suffices to show that all of the 2 2 k terms are non-negative. Observe that if ω(i) = ω ′ (i) for each i ∈ I but S ω = S ω ′ then for any χ Sω χ S ω ′ = 0, whence the corresponding integral is 0. We thus restrict ourselves to the case where, whenever ω ↾ I = ω ′ ↾ I, S ω = S ω ′ . In this case, we have
Since the inside of the integral is always non-negative, this term is nonnegative.
Lemma 7.28. D(f ) is measurable with respect to B k,k−1 .
Proof. It suffices to show that if ||E(f | B k,k−1 )|| = 0 then
Well, we have
Observe that, for a given h 1 , we have
The lemma now follows. 
For the other direction, if ||E(f | B k−1 )|| > 0, we may find B I -measurable B I so that f χ B I dµ = 0, whence
Soundness and Completeness
Since AML is a variant of first-order logic, it is no surprise that AML satisfies a completeness theorem with an appropriate set of axioms. Throughout this section, we fix a signature L.
The following collection of axioms will be called AML.
(1) FOL: A standard collection of axioms for first-order logic, (2) Q ≥0 : All true quantifier-free sentences of (Q ≥0 , +, ·, <, 0, 1),
We describe two additional families of axioms which we do not take to be part of the standard axiomization, but which axiomatize those structures with appropriate additional properties:
(1) I is the following scheme of axioms: For any n and any permutation σ of [1, n] , writing σ(x 1 , . . . , x n ) for (x σ(1) , . . . , x σ(n) ), we have
F is the following scheme of axioms:
F + is the scheme F plus the following scheme of additional axioms:
The scheme F + can be viewed as the "completion" of the scheme F; not all Fubini structures satisfy these axioms, but they may be convenient in some circumstances, and the most important structures-finite models under the counting measure and their ultraproducts-do satisfy these axioms.
We first prove the following:
(1) Every axiom of AML is true in every L-structure.
(2) Every axiom of I is true in every L-structure satisfying invariance under permutation of coordinates. (3) Every axiom of F is true in every measured L-structure.
Proof.
• FOL: The FOL group is true as in standard first-order logic.
• Q ≥0 : The Q ≥0 group is true because it is, by definition, the set of statements true of Q ≥0 .
• Emptyset: The emptyset axioms are true because { c ∈ M n :
M,n <t , and therefore M m x < t.ϕ [s] . The other comparability axiom is similar.
• Coherence, Additivity, and Product:
By the coherence condition on M, we also have B ∈ B M,n ≤t , and therefore M m x ≤ t.ϕ [s] . The other coherence axiom, the additivity axioms, and the product axioms similarly follow directly from the properties of AML structures.
Since M satisfies invariance of coordinates, σ(B) ∈ B M,n <t , and therefore { c ∈ M n : M ϕ[s( c/σ( x))]} ⊆ σ(B), and therefore M m σ( x) < t.ϕ [s] . The other axiom is similar.
• F: This is the content of Remark 3.7.
We now turn towards the topic of completeness. Definition 8.2. Let F be a set of L-sentences.
(1) F is consistent if there is no L-sentence ϕ such that both ϕ and ¬ϕ are derivable from F. (2) F is complete if for every sentence ϕ in the language of L, either ϕ ∈ F or ¬ϕ ∈ F.
The following lemma is proven in the same way as for first-order logic; see [6] . Lemma 8.3. If F is a consistent set of sentences in the language L, then there is a complete consistent set of sentences F ′ such that F ⊆ F ′ .
Theorem 8.4 (Completeness Theorem)
. Let F be a set of sentences consistent with AML. Then there is a model M of F. If F is also consistent with AML + I, then we may assume that M satisfies invariance under permutation of coordinates. If F is consistent with AML + F, then we may further assume that M is measured. If F is consistent with AML + I + F, then we may assume M is measured and satisfies invariance under permutation of coordinates.
Proof. For simplicity, we will assume that L does not include equality; the modifications for when it does are standard; see [6] .
We define by recursion an increasing sequence (L α : α ≤ ω 1 ) of signatures and an increasing sequence (F α : α ≤ ω 1 ) of consistent, complete sets of L α -sentences. Let L 0 be the signature L. Let F 0 be a complete, consistent extension of F ∪ AML. Suppose that L α and F α have been constructed. Suppose n > 0 and S is a countable set of sentences all of whose free variables are from {x 1 , . . . , x n }. Further, suppose that for every ϕ 1 , . . . , ϕ m ∈ S, ∃x 1 ∃x 2 · · · ∃x n (ϕ 1 ∧ · · · ∧ ϕ m ) is a sentence in F α . Then fix fresh constants c i S for i ≤ n and let L α+1 be the signature consisting of L α together with all these new constant symbols for every such S. Define F 0 α+1 to be F α together with the new sentences ϕ[c i S /x i ] for each ϕ ∈ S. It is immediate that F 0 α+1 is consistent. Let F α+1 be a complete, consistent extension of F 0 α+1 . Note that, by instantiating universal quantifiers, F α+1 contains the axioms for all formulas in the extended language.
For a limit ordinal λ ≤ ω 1 , set L λ = β<λ L β and F λ = β<λ F β . Note that any ϕ in L λ is already in some L β , so F λ is complete, and any contradiction in F λ was already present at some F β , so F λ is consistent.
We now construct a model M of F ω 1 . Let M be the set of terms of L ω 1 . For each function symbol f , set f M (t 1 , . . . , t n ) := f (t 1 , . . . , t n ), and for each predicate symbol R, set R M := {(t 1 , . . . , t n ) : R(t 1 , . . . , t n ) ∈ F ω 1 }.
For each n, let B n 0 ⊆ P(M n ) consist of sets of the form { t : ϕ( t) ∈ F ω 1 } for L ω 1 -formulas ϕ. Let B n be the σ-algebra generated by B n 0 . For any B ∈ B n 0 , define ρ(B) = inf{t ∈ Q >0 : m x < t.ϕ ∈ F ω 1 }. Note that, using the comparability axioms, ρ(B) is well-defined regardless of what representative ϕ we choose.
Suppose B, C ∈ B n 0 with B ∩ C = ∅, ρ(B) = b, ρ(C) = c and let ϕ, ψ be formulas defining B and C respectively. Then for any rationals By the Carathéodory extension theorem, each ρ extends to a measure µ n on the B n which agrees with ρ on B n 0 . To show that µ m+n extends µ m ⊗ µ n , it suffices to show that µ m+n (B × C) = µ m (B)µ n (C) where B, C belong to B m 0 and B n 0 respectively, since these are dense subsets of B m and B n . But this is immediately implied by the product axioms.
We complete the construction by taking B M,n ⊲⊳a to be precisely those B = {t : m x ⊲⊳ a.ϕ}. These sets are, by construction, measurable and compatible with the measure.
If F is consistent with AML + I, we may assume that AML + I ⊆ F ω 1 . To conclude that M satisfies invariance under permutation of coordinates, it again suffices to show this for any element of B n 0 , which follows immediately from I.
If F is consistent with AML + F or AML + I + F, we may assume that AML + F ⊆ F ω 1 . The same proof as in Proposition 3.6 shows that the measure µ satisfies the Fubini property, whence M is a measured structure.
Appendix A. First-order logic
In this section, we briefly describe the basic syntax and semantics of firstorder logic. Definition A.1. A first-order signature is a set L = ((c i ) i∈I , (F j ) j∈J , (R k ) k∈K ), where:
• each c i is a constant symbol;
• each F j is a function symbol;
• each R k is a predicate symbol. Furthermore, each function and predicate symbol come equipped with an arity, which is a positive natural number. If n is the arity of F j , then we say that F j is an n-ary function symbol; likewise for predicate symbols.
The symbols in the signature L have no meaning on their own. In order to achieve meaning, they must be interpreted in an L-structure: Definition A.2. Suppose that L is a first-order signature. Then an Lstructure is a structure M which consists of a nonempty set M , called the universe of M , and such that M provides interpretations of the symbols in L as follows:
• For each constant symbol c in L, the interpretation of c in M is an element c M ∈ M ; • For each n-ary function symbol F in L, the interpretation of F in M is a function F M : M n → M ; • For each n-ary predicate symbol P in L, the interpretation of P in M is a subset P M ⊆ M n .
We must stress that an L-structure does not need to interpret the symbols of L in a "sensible" way. For example, a group (G, · G , 1 G ) is naturally a structure in the language L = {·, 1} consisting of a single 2-ary (or binary) function symbol · and a single constant symbol 1. However, the set {1, 2, 3} can be made into an L-structure by interpreting c as 3 and interpreting the function symbol as the binary function which is constantly 2; this structure is by no means a group. In actual applications, however, structures usually interpret the symbols in a "natural" fashion.
Suppose that M and N are L-structures with universes M and N respectively. Then a map j : M → N is a homomorphism of L-structures if:
(1) j(c M ) = c N for all constant symbols c in L; (2) j(F M ( a)) = F N (j( a)) for all n-ary function symbols F and all a ∈ M n ; (3) a ∈ P M ⇔ j( a) ∈ P N for all n-ary predicate symbols P and all a ∈ M n . We now wish to discuss how to express statements in first-order logic and to understand when a given statement is true or false in a structure. For the rest of this section, we fix a first-order signature L. We also fix an infinite set V of variables.
Definition A.3. The set of L-terms is the smallest set of (finite) strings of symbols satisfying:
• If c is a constant symbol, then c is an L-term. If x is a variable, then x is an L-term. • If t 1 , . . . , t n are L-terms and F is an n-ary function symbol in L, then F (t 1 , . . . , t n ) is an L-term.
Observe that L-terms name elements of the structure (after elements of the structure are "plugged in" for the variables).
Definition A.4. The set of L-formulae is the smallest set of (finite) strings of symbols satisfying:
• If t 1 and t 2 are L-terms, then t 1 = t 2 is an L-formula.
• If t 1 , . . . , t n are L-terms and P is an n-ary predicate symbol, then P (t 1 , . . . , t n ) is an L-formula.
• If ϕ 1 and ϕ 2 are L-formulae, then ¬ϕ 1 and ϕ 1 ∧ ϕ 2 are L-formulae.
• If ϕ is an L-formula and x is a variable, then ∀xϕ is an L-formula.
The formulae in the first two bullets of the above definition are referred to as atomic L-formulae. In proving facts about all formulae, one first proves the fact for atomic formulae and then one shows that the fact is preserved under the connectives ¬ and ∧ and the quantifier ∀; such an argument is said to be done by induction on the complexity of the formula.
If ϕ is a formula and x is a variable that appears in ϕ, then x can either appear free or bound in ϕ, and the distinction can be defined by recursion on the complexity of formulae. If ϕ is atomic, then any variable appears free in ϕ. If x appears free in ϕ, then x appears free in ¬ϕ. x appears free in ϕ 1 ∧ ϕ 2 if and only if x appears free in ϕ 1 or x appears free in ϕ 2 . Finally, x occurs free in ∀yϕ if and only if x appears free in ϕ and x = y. We often write ϕ(x 1 , . . . , x n ) to indicate that all of the free variables of ϕ are among x 1 , . . . , x n .
Fix an L-structure M with universe M . A valuation on M is a function s : V → M . Observe that any valuation extends naturally to a function s : T → M , where T is the set of L-terms, by defining s(c) = c M for each constant symbol c of L and recursively defining s (F (t 1 , . . . , t n )) = s(F M (s(t 1 ), . . . , s(t n ))). Given a valuation s on M, a tuple of variables x = (x 1 , . . . , x n ) and a tuple of elements a = (a 1 , . . . , a n ) from M , we define s( a/ x) to be the valuation on M obtained from s be redefining (if necessary) s on x i to take the value a i . Definition A.5. Given an L-formula ϕ and a valuation s on M, we define the relation M |= ϕ[s], read "M models ϕ with respect to the valuation s," by recursion on the complexity of formulae:
• M |= t 1 = t 2 [s] if and only if s(t 1 ) = s(t 2 ).
• M |= P (t 1 , . . . , t n )[s] if and only if (s(t 1 ), . . . , s(t n )) ∈ P M .
• One should think of M |= ϕ[s] as saying that "ϕ is true in M when every variable x is replaced by the element s(x) of M ." Given a formula ϕ(x 1 , . . . , x n ) and a valuation s on M, it is rather clear that whether or not M |= ϕ[s] holds depends only on the values s(x 1 ), . . . , s(x n ). Thus, given a 1 , . . . , a n ∈ M , we often write M |= ϕ(a 1 , . . . , a n ) to indicate that M |= ϕ[s] for some (any) valuation s on M satisfying s(x i ) = a i for i = 1, . . . , n.
The notion of a definable set is of critical importance in model theory. Given an L-structure M and X ⊆ M m , we say that X is definable if there is a formula ϕ(x 1 , . . . , x m , y 1 , . . . , y n ) and elements b 1 , . . . , b n ∈ M such that Definition B.5. An ultrafilter U on I is said to be countably incomplete if there exist (D n : n ∈ N) in U such that D 0 ⊃ D 1 ⊃ D 2 ⊃ · · · and such that n∈N D n = ∅.
Observe that any countably incomplete ultrafilter is nonprincipal and any nonprincipal ultrafilter on N is necessarily countably incomplete; this is seen by taking D n = N \ {0, 1, . . . , n}. The importance of countably incomplete ultrafilters is the following proposition, whose proof we borrow from [14] .
Proposition B.6. If U is a countably incomplete ultrafilter on I, then M := U M i is ℵ 1 -saturated: any family (X n : n ∈ N) of nonempty definable subsets of M k which satisfies the finite intersection property has nonempty intersection.
Proof. For simplicity, we assume that I = N; the more general case requires an easy technical modification of the argument we give. Furthermore, without loss of generality, we may assume that X n ⊇ X n+1 for all n. If X n = {x ∈ M k : M |= ϕ n (x, a n )}, then set X n i := {x ∈ M k i : M i |= ϕ n (x, a n i )}. Set J n := {i : X 1 i ⊇ · · · ⊇ X n i = ∅}; by the Loś theorem, we have that J n ∈ U for each n ∈ N. Observe that J n ⊇ J n+1 for each n.
We now show how to construct a sequence (c i ) ∈ i∈I M i such that, for each n, c i ∈ X n i for almost all i. This is easy to accomplish if n J n = ∅, so we assume that n J n = ∅. If i / ∈ J 0 , let c i ∈ M i be arbitrary. Now assume that i ∈ J 0 . Let n i := max{n : i ≥ n and i ∈ J n }. Choose c i ∈ X n i i . Observe now that if n ≤ i and i ∈ J n , then c i ∈ X n i , whence c i ∈ J n . Consequently, for each n, we have {i : n ≤ i} ∩ J n ⊆ {i : c i ∈ X n i } ∈ U since U is nonprincipal.
